Hindustan Commercial Corporation Pvt. ... vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr on 11 December, 2024

Author: Anand Pathak

Bench: Anand Pathak, Roopesh Chandra Varshney

 1

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
 AT GWALIOR
 BEFORE
 HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND PATHAK
 &
 HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ROOPESH CHANDRA VARSHNEY

 ON THE 11th OF DECEMBER, 2024

 WRIT APPEAL NO. 429 of 2016

 HINDUSTAN COMMERCIAL CORPORATION PVT. LTD.
 Vs.
 STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPEARANCE:
 Shri N.K. Gupta - Senior Advocate with Shri Santosh Agrawal
and Shri S.D. Singh - Advocates for the appellant.
 Shri Ankur Mody - Additional Advocate General for respondents
No.1&2/State.
 Shri Arvind Dudawat - Senior Advocate with Shri Arun Dudawat
and Shri Rahul Jha - Advocates for respondent No.3.
 Shri Nirmal Sharma and Ms. Dimple Vyas - Advocates for the
intervenor.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh
 Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam,
 2005 is preferred by the appellant (hereinafter referred to as "the
 petitioner") being crestfallen by the order dated 02-12-2016 passed
 by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.4032 of 2005 whereby
 the writ petition filed by the petitioner has been dismissed.

2. For appreciating the controversy in better perspective following
 dates and events are worth reproduction:

 Dates Events
 2

19-11-1942 One Sampat Kumar Majeji moved an application
 to the Gwalior Estate for allotment of the land.
11-02-1943 Gwalior Estate allotted land in question to
 Sampat Kumar Majeji, for establishing the Paint
 & Varnish Factory, on the conditions mentioned
 therein. (Annexur P/8).

16-02-1943 Sampat Kumar Majeji accepted the terms and
 conditions, thereby confirming the same.

 Thereafter, M/s. Gwalior Paints & Chemical
 Industries Ltd., was established.

28-08-1950 Bijmohan Das Nagori and Motilal Gupta in the
 capacity of Director of M/s The Gwalior Paint &
 Chemical Industries Ltd. sold the rights, title and
 interest in the immovable properties to M/s
 Cotton Traders, Pvt., Ltd.

05-01-1959 M/s The Cotton Traders Pvt., Ltd., Through
 Director Goverdhan Das Nagori, & Ramnivas
 Bangad sold the factory to M/s Hindustan
 Commercial Corporation Pvt. Ltd., whose
 Directors were Shri Damodar Das Nagori, &
 Brijmohan Das Nagori.

 It is relevant to mention here that according to
 respondents this sale was contrary and
 violative to condition No. 14 of allotment.

24-11-1977 After getting knowledge of the aforesaid sale
 transaction, Director of Industries M.P. sent
 proposal for cancellation of aforesaid allotment.
03-01-1978 Allotment order and lease of M/s Gwalior Paints
 3

 and Chemicals Industries was cancelled.

 (Annexure P/10).

 This cancellation order was never challenged and
 attained finality.

22-08-1978 Since even after cancellation of allotment,
 petitioner did not vacate the factory premises.
 therefore respondent No.3 filed an application for
 eviction, before the competent Authority against

 (i) M/s Gwalior Paints & Chemical Industries and

 (ii) Hindustan Commercial Corporation Pvt.

 (present petitioner).

12-02-1982 Chandra Mohan Nagori submitted his reply and
 submitted that his possession is legal.

27-08-1991 Competent Authority after rehearing the parties
 on 16.08 1991 passed order of eviction, thereby
 directed to evict the land in question upto 13.09.
 1991.

12-09-1991 Chandra Mohan Nagori, filed application that
 since 1985 he is not in possession and he has no
 concern with the land in question.

23-07-1996 Competent Authority passed order of eviction and
 against that order, present petitioner filed appeal
 before the Commissioner (Appellate Authority)
 challenging the order dated 23.07.1996.

07-04-1997 Appellate authority allowed the appeal with
 direction to decide the case of petitioner by
 passing fresh order after giving opportunity of
 hearing to petitioner.

 4

17-04-2000 After remand, fresh notices were issued to non-

 applicants therein and also possession holders.
12-06-2000 Pursuant to which petitioner herein on
 12.06.2000 submitted preliminary objection dated
 05.06. 2000 alleging therein that land in question
 has never been allotted to Sampat Kumar Majeji
 and the said land (31 bighas) was given by the
 then Zamidar to the Trust and then Trust given
 the said land to the present petitioner.

05-07-2000 Respondents herein filed reply to the preliminary
 objections.

16-08-2000 Competent authority issued fresh notice to show
 cause as to why order of eviction may not be
 passed upto 24.08.2000.

04-11-2000 petitioner filed reply to the said show cause
 notice.

04-11-2000 to 31-05- Matter kept pending.

2005
09-01-2001 petitioner filed W.P. No.61/2001 alleging that the
 land in question was never granted on lease to
 him therefore provision of the M.P. Lok Parisar
 (Bedakhali) Adhiniyam, 1974 are not applicable.
29-07-2001 This Court disposed of the said petition with
 direction to hear petitioner on his preliminary
 objection and after hearing him, passed an
 appropriate order, before proceedings further in
 the matter.

30-05-2005 After hearing, case was posted for order by the
 5

 authority.

06-06-2005 Order dated 06.06.2005 was passed by the
 authority rejecting the preliminary objection and
 the case was fixed for hearing. This order has not
 been challenged by the petitioner. This attained
 finality.

22-06-2005 Competent Authority after hearing the parties and
 considering written arguments submitted by
 present petitioner on 14.06.2005 passed the order
 of eviction. It is worth mentioning the fact that
 this order was passed after 27 years of institution
 of case.

27-06-2005 Against the order dated 22.06.2005 Appeal No.
 58/2004-05 was filed by present petitioner.

12-09-2005 Appeal preferred by the petitioner, has been
 dismissed by the appellate authority.

02-12-2016 Orders dated 22-06-2005 and 12-09-2005 were
 challenged by the petitioner by filing
 W.P.No.4032/2005. Learned Writ Court dismissed
 the said writ petition. Thereafter, the instant writ
 appeal is preferred.

3. It is the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that all
 contingencies for eviction under the provisions of M.P. Lok Parisar
 (Bedakhali) Adhiniyam, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "the
 Bedakhali Adhiniyam") are not established. According to learned
 senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, the officer who acted
 as a competent authority was not vested with the power of
 competent authority in absence of any authorization/delegation by
 6

 due notification provided under Section 3 of the Bedakhali
 Adhiniyam, therefore, original order of eviction itself is nullity.
 No lease deed was ever shown or produced by the State
 Government to the petitioner or its predecessor in title nor any
 rent receipt has been shown establishing the relationship of lessor-
 lessee, hence the provisions of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam cannot
 be made applicable.

4. Learned senior counsel also refers Section 17 of the Bedakhali
 Adhiniyam to submit that even after delegation of power as per
 Section 17 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam by the State Government
 to the Collectors vide notification dated 05-02-1976, the Collector
 assumed the power of State Government but the same does not
 fulfill the mandatory requirement of Section 3 of the Bedakhali
 Adhiniyam. Question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter
 and therefore, whole proceedings stand void-ab-initio. In support
 of his submission, learned senior counsel appearing for the
 petitioner relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of
 Balvant N. Viswamitra & Ors. Vs. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (dead)
 Through L.Rs. and others, AIR 2004 SC 4377 and Cantonment
 Board and Anr. Vs. Chruch of North India, (2012) 12 SCC 573
 and also the judgment of learned Single Bench of this Court in the
 case of Indu Gupta Vs. State of M.P. and others, 1997 (2) MPLJ
 146 and the same was followed by the Division Bench in the case
 of Phal Singh Yadav Vs. Commissioner Division Gwalior and
 others in Writ Petition No.4724 of 2017 decided vide order
 dated 15-11-2017.

5. The land in question was not established to be the land
 7

 owned/vested with the State Government as it was a Zamindari
 land and on the date of vesting it was occupied by Gwalior State
 Trust Ltd. (erstwhile Gwalior Estate) which became Pakka Krishak
 and thereafter bhumiswami. Documents Annexure P/8 and P/9 do
 not suggest that the petitioner stepped into the shoes of Sampat
 Kumar Majeji.

6. It is further submitted that in light of the case of Smt. (Dr.) Sajni
 Bajaj Vs. Indore Development Authority and others, 2018 (2)
 RN 321, Shri Suresh Sharma the then Joint Collector was not
 competent authority to pass order dated 22-06-2005 (Annexure
 P/5) under the Bedakhali Adhiniyam.

7. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that
 General Manager, District Industries Center, Gwalior filed an
 application on 22-08-1978 with the averments that in the year 1943
 they have allotted the land bearing survey numbers mentioned in
 para one of Annexure P/2 to the Gwalior Paints and Chemical
 Industry Gwalior. According to petitioner, it was not allotment of
 the land on lease but it speaks about lease will be given by the
 department on rent and therefore, the Court below has committed
 error in not interpreting the said document in correct perspective.
 The identification of property is also under doubt because it was
 not same property which State wanted but it was some different
 property. In absence of any proof produced regarding lease deed or
 receiving lease rent by the respondents, learned Single Judge
 proceeded on assumption and presumption and did not consider
 the fact that it was the land purchased by the petitioner.

8. It is further submitted that learned Single Judge treated the petition
 8

 as title suit wherein petitioner has raised the bona fide dispute over
 the ownership of State Government. It was not the land which
 could have been treated under the purview of public premises as it
 was a private property. It is further submitted that if there is bona
 fide dispute regarding title of the Government to any property, the
 Government cannot take unilateral decision in its own favour that
 the property belongs to it and on the basis of such decision cannot
 take recourse to the summary remedy provided under Section 6 of
 the Bedakhali Adhiniyam of the person who is in possession. He
 relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of
 Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Thummala Krishna Rao
 and another, AIR 1982 SC 1081, Kushal Chand Vs. State of
 M.P. and others, 2001(1) MPLJ 680 and Bhagwani Bai Vs. State
 of M.P. and another, 2006(1) MPLJ 370. In absence of lessor-
 lessee relationship, dismissal of writ petition was unwarranted.

9. Per contra, Shri Ankur Mody, learned Additional Advocate
 General opposed the submissions and raised the plea of alternative
 remedy. Competent authority had the jurisdiction. Even if the
 competent authority did not have jurisdiction (although denied the
 fact) even then its orders and proceedings are saved by de facto
 doctrine. He relied upon the judgments of Apex Court in the case
 of Gokaraju Rangaraju Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981
 SC 1473 and Pradeep Kumar Sonthalia Vs. Dhiraj Prasad Sahu
 and another, (2021) 6 SCC 523.

10. The order of eviction is in respect of private land illegally occupied
 by the petitioner, therefore, competent authority had jurisdiction.
 He prayed for dismissal of this writ appeal.

 9

11. Shri Arvind Dudawat, learned senior counsel appearing for
 respondent No.3 argued at length. According to him, petitioner did
 not take the said objection at any stage upto the Writ Court
 regarding jurisdiction/competence of the competent authority,
 therefore, as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of
 Treaty Construction & Anr. Vs. Ruby Tower Cooperative
 Housing Society Limited, (2019) 8 SCC 157, Abdul Khadey Vs.
 Tarabai and others, (2011) 6 SCC 199 and Mr. B.S.N. Joshi &
 Sons Ltd. Vs. Nair Coal Services Ltd. and others, (2006) 11
 SCC 548. petitioner is precluded from raising such objection.

12. It is further submitted by learned senior counsel that by virtue of
 provisions of Section 3 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam, an officer not
 below the rank of Assistant Collector or Deputy Collector may be
 appointed as competent authority. In the present case, the officer
 who has passed the order - Annexure P/2 was holding the post of
 Joint Collector at the relevant point of time and Joint Collector is
 senior post to the post of Deputy Collector. Therefore, he had
 authority and competence for exercising the power of competent
 authority under the Bedakhali Adhiniyam.

13. While exercising the powers conferred under Section 17 of the
 Bedakhali Adhiniyam, the State Government vide its notification
 dated 05-02-1976 delegated its power under the Bedakhali
 Adhiniyam to all Collectors of the State Government and thereafter
 the Collector, Gwalior in exercise of such power vide order dated
 27-12-2004 authorized Shri Suresh Sharma, the then Joint
 Collector to act as competent authority under the Bedakhali
 Adhiniyam in the area within the municipal limit of Gwalior. The
 10

 above said notification and order are on record as Annexure R/3-1
 and R/3-3.

14. It is further submitted that the petitioner while submitting the
 objection before the competent authority took the plea that he is in
 possession of 31 bigha of the land granted by ex Zamindar to the
 Trust and then to Company, however no such document has ever
 been produced either before the competent authority or before this
 Court to establish that predecessor in title of petitioner was granted
 the land by erstwhile Zamindar.

15. In fact vide order dated 03-01-1978, State Government cancelled
 the allotment of the land granted in favour of Gwalior Paints and
 Chemical Industry and before the competent authority, petitioner
 admitted this fact that allotment of land to the Gwalior Paints and
 Chemical Industry has been cancelled. However, the said order of
 cancellation has never been put to challenge, therefore, the said
 order attained finality.

16. From the registered sale deed as submitted by the petitioner along
 with I.A.No.6752/2016 before learned Writ Court it is evident that
 the petitioner purchased the land in question through registered
 sale deed dated 05-01-1959 from M/s Cotton Traders Limited and
 its vendor purchased the said property from Gwalior Paints and
 Chemical Industry through registered sale deed dated 26-08-1950.
 Original allottee did not have any authority to transfer the land.

17. After dismissal of writ petition of the petitioner, possession of
 land in question has been taken on 17-09-2005. Plots have been
 demarcated and given to the entrepreneurs/industrialists by
 respondent No.3 Corporation. It is in the interest of justice that
 11

 over the said land, Industries may flourish and sincere
 Entrepreneurs be invited to establish different industries so that
 new employment avenues be generated. No case for interference is
 made made out in favour of petitioner, hence the appeal preferred
 by the petitioner deserves dismissal.

18. One intervention application was filed by Gwalior Sookshma Evam
 Laghu Udhyog Sangh through its President. As submitted, this
 Association represents Micro and Small industries which are
 situated at the adjacent place to the land in question. For expansion
 of industries repeated requests were made to the department but of
 no avail. Because of pendency of this appeal, allotment of land is
 halted and members of MSME industries are suffering. They are
 eager to get plots for expansion of their industries.

19. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the
 documents appended thereto.

20. In the instant appeal, petitioner has taken exception to the order
 dated 02-12-2016 passed by learned Writ Court whereby the writ
 petition preferred by the petitioner got dismissed. In the writ
 petition, petitioner sought following reliefs:

 "(1) That, the Writ of Mandamus/Certiorari may
 kindly be issued whereby the impugned orders
 dated 12-09-2005 and 22-06-2005 (Annexure P/1
 and P/2) passed by respondent no.2, may kindly be
 quashed.
 (2) That, if on the basis of the wrong and without
 jurisdiction order if any possession has been taken
 by respondent, the respondent no.2 be directed to
 12

 deliver the possession back to the petitioner.
 (3) That, any other writ, order or direction as this
 Hon'ble Court deems fit, may also be issued doing
 justice in the matter.
 (4) That, the cost of the petition may also be
 allowed to the petitioner."
21. Perusal of reliefs claimed in the writ petition, it appears that
 petitioners challenged the order dated 12-09-2005 (Annexure P/1
 of writ petition) whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner
 before the Commissioner Gwalior Division got dismissed and the
 order dated 22-06-2005 passed by the competent authority under
 the Bedakhali Adhiniyam whereby the application preferred by the
 State Government through General Manager, District Industries
 Center, Gwalior (respondent No.3 herein) was allowed and eviction
 order against the petitioner was passed.

22. Incidentally, perusal of the order dated 22-06-2005 indicates that
 Government cancelled the allotment/lease deed granted to the
 petitioner (predecessor in title - Gwalior Paints and Chemical
 Industries Ltd.) vide order dated 03-01-1978. Copy of the said
 order of cancellation was part of record before the competent
 authority. Therefore, basic order is dated 03-01-1978 when the
 allotment order/lease deed was cancelled and petitioner never
 challenged the said basic order dated 03-01-1978. This basic order
 is still intact. Petitioner challenged the consequential order of
 eviction by competent authority being unauthorized occupant.
 Challenging the consequential order without challenging the basic
 order is not permissible {See: P. Chitharanja Menon and others
 13

 Vs. A. Balakrishnan and others, (1977) 3 SCC 255}.

23. Said proceeding was initiated purportedly under Section 5 of the
 Bedakhali Adhiniyam. Said provision reads as under:

 "5. Eviction of unauthorised occupants. (1) On the date
 specified in the notice issued under sub-section (1) of
 Section 4, the competent authority shall take all such
 evidence as may be produced in support of the cause to be
 shown. If, after considering the cause, if any shown and any
 evidence that may be produced and after giving the person
 concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard,
 regarding the alleged unauthorised occupation of the
 public premises, the competent authority is satisfied that the
 public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the
 competent authority may make an order of eviction, for
 reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the public
 premises shall be vacated, on such date as may be specified
 in the order by, all persons who may be in occupation
 thereof or any part thereof; and cause a copy of the order to
 be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part
 of the public premises.
 (2) The competent authority may, on an application made
 by the person against whom an order is passed under sub-
 section (1) grant such time for vacating the premises, as it
 deems fit, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit to
 impose.

 (3) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of
 eviction-

 (i) before the date specified in sub-section (1); or
 14

 (ii) where time is granted under sub-section (2) within the
 time so granted the competent authority or any other officer
 duly authorised by the competent authority in this behalf
 may evict that person from, and take possession of, the
 public premises, and may, for that purpose, use such force
 as may be necessary."

24. When the order dated 03-01-1978 was passed and never challenged
 by the petitioner then it attained finality and therefore, the
 proceedings under Section 5 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam is mainly
 to evict the unauthorized occupant, possession of which became
 unauthorized since 03-01-1978. The application was filed on 22-
 08-1978. Petitioner knew this fact regarding passing of the order
 dated 03-01-1978, immediately after passing of the said order.
 Matter lingered on till 2005 for more than 27 years. Thereafter,
 impugned order has been passed. Therefore, in absence of
 challenge being made to the original/basic order dated 03-01-1978,
 consequential order even if is set aside even then it is of no
 consequence. In the case of Amarjeet Singh and others Vs. Devi
 Ratan and others, (2010) 1 SCC 417, the Supreme Court has
 given guidance in the following words:

 28. In the instant case, promotions had been made by two
 different DPC's held on 19.12.1998 and 22.1.1999. Both the
 DPC's had made promotions under different rules on
 different criterion and their promotions had been made with
 retrospective effect with different dates notionally. In the
 writ petition before the High Court, the promotion of the
 appellants had not been under challenge. The seniority
 15

which is consequential to the promotions could not be
challenged without challenging the promotions.
Challenging the consequential order without challenging
the basic order is not permissible. (vide Chithranja Menon
& Ors. Vs. A. Balakrishnan).

29. In Roshan Lal & ors. Vs. International Airport
Authority of India & ors., AIR 1981 SC 597, the petitions
were primarily confined to the seniority list and this Court
held that challenge to appointment orders could not be
entertained because of inordinate delay and in absence of
the same, validity of consequential, seniority could not be
examined. In such a case, a party is under a legal
obligation to challenge the basic order and if and only if
the same is found to be wrong, consequential orders may be
examined.

30. In H.V. Pardasani etc. Vs. Union of India, this Court
observed that : (SCC p. 473 para 9)
 "9. .......if the petitioners are not able to establish
that the determination of their seniority is wrong and they
have been prejudiced by such adverse determination, their
ultimate claim to promotion would, indeed, not succeed."

 A similar view had been reiterated by this Court in
Government of Maharashtra & ors. Vs. Deokar's Distillery.

31. These appeals are squarely covered by the aforesaid
judgments. We are of the considered opinion that in absence
of challenge to the promotion of the appellants, relief of
quashing the consequential seniority list could not have
been granted."

 16

25. The above said judgment was passed by the Supreme Court in the
 realm of service jurisprudence. However in tenancy and land laws,
 the Supreme Court again gave guidance in the case of Edukanti
 Kistamma and others Vs. S. Venkatareddy and others, (2010) 1
 SCC 756 in following manner:

 "22. It is a settled legal proposition that challenge to
 consequential order without challenging the basic
 order/statutory provision on the basis of which the order
 has been passed cannot be entertained. Therefore, it is a
 legal obligation on the part of the party to challenge the
 basic order and only if the same is found to be wrong,
 consequential order may be examined (vide P. Chithranja
 Menon & Ors. Vs. A. Balakrishnan & Ors., H. V. Pardasani
 etc. Vs. Union of India & Ors., and Government of
 Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Deokar's Distillery.
 23. Undisputedly, the grant of a right or a permit/licence
 under any statutory provision requires determination of
 rights and entitlement of the parties. Once such a right is
 determined, the issuance of the order on the basis of such
 determination remains a ministerial act."
26. It is noteworthy to mention that after passing of the order dated 03-
 01-1978 impugned order dated 22-06-2005 was passed by the
 competent authority and affirmed by the appellate authority vide
 order dated 12-09-2005 and both these orders were affirmed by
 learned Writ Court vide order dated 02-12-2016. This appeal is
 heard and going to be decided in the month of December, 2024.
 Around 47 years have passed since allotment order/lease deed
 17

 was cancelled by the State Government. In other words when the
 period is counted from the period of allotment i.e. 11-02-1943 then
 it appears that for 35 years, land was enjoyed by the petitioner
 whereas litigation dragged around 47 years for eviction of
 petitioner. It is also worth mentioning the fact that possession of
 the land has been taken by the respondents on 17-09-2005 and
 many industrial plots have been carved out to allot for the aspirants
 who intend to establish their industries over the said plots.

27. Therefore, intervention application by an Association of M.S.M.E.
 was also filed. They are waiting for allotments.

28. So far as the submission of petitioner regarding land coming under
 exception/saving under the Zamindari Abolition Act, 1952
 (hereinafter referred to as "the Zamindari Act") is concerned, the
 said argument is misplaced on the ground that erstwhile Gwalior
 Estate granted land on 11-02-1943 to one Sampat Kumar Majeji
 and permission was granted to start factory on the terms and
 conditions mentioned therein. Said condition includes condition
 No.14 which reads as under:

 "14. You shall have no right to give any sub-lease of the
 concessioned lease without previous sanction of the
 Government."
29. The said document is placed as Annexure P/8 with the writ appeal.
 Vide letter dated 16-02-1943 vide Annexure P/9, said Sampat
 Kumar Majeji affirmed the terms and conditions laid down in the
 allotment order dated 16-02-1943 and agreed to start Paints and
 Varnish Factory as per the said terms and conditions. Therefore, the
 erstwhile Gwalior State granted the land in question on lease
 18

 admeasuring 31 bigha of the land (as per respondent No.3).
 Therefore, the said land was never been the agriculture land,
 therefore, did not fall under the Zamindari Act. Said Act and its
 different provisions contemplate certain contingencies regarding
 agriculture land but since it was an open land meant for industrial
 purposes, therefore, Gwalior State granted this land on lease for
 industrial purposes. Predecessor in title of petitioner Sampat
 Kumar Majeji applied on 19-11-1942 for allotment of land. On
 11-02-1943 allotment was made. If land was under Zamindari,
 then why Majeji applied for allotment. Therefore, no question of
 any benefit accrued to the petitioner on the basis of the Zamindari
 Act, arises.

30. In fact question of allotment of lease cannot be reagitated because
 by way of Writ Petition No.61/2001, petitioner alleged that the land
 in question was never granted on lease to him, therefore, provisions
 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam are not applicable. Learned Writ Court
 disposed of the said writ petition vide order dated 29-07-2001 and
 directed the competent authority to decide such objection and
 thereafter proceed further. Vide order dated 06-06-2005 the
 competent authority rejected the preliminary objections and case
 was fixed for hearing. This order has not been challenged by the
 petitioner. Thus, this order attained finality. Therefore, on this
 count also, petitioner cannot assert the question of grant of lease.

31. Even otherwise after the Independence on 15 th August, 1947 all
 lands belonging to native States vest in State under different
 constitutional provisions. Even Section 57 of the M.P. Land
 Revenue Code, 1959 contemplates that all lands under the State of
 19

 M.P. belongs to the State. Therefore, the land deemed to be and
 vested in State after 1947. The breach of condition No.14 by way
 of sale further made the case of petitioner vulnerable. Majeji did
 not continue with business for which land was sought.

32. On 28-08-1950 Brijmohan Das Nagori and Motilal Gupta posing
 themselves to be directors of the Gwalior Paints and Chemical
 Industries Ltd. sold its right, title and interest in the immovable
 properties to M/s Cotton Traders Pvt. Ltd. When they were bound
 by the lease conditions then the alleged sale transaction if any
 held was void-ab-initio. Not only this, on 05-01-1959 M/s Cotton
 Traders Pvt. Ltd. through Govardhan Das Nagori and Ramnivas
 Bangad sold the factory to Ms/ Hindustan Commercial Corporation
 Pvt. Ltd. (present petitioner) whose directors were Damodardas
 Nagori and Brijmohan Nagori through registered sale deed.

33. It appears that three real brothers namely Brijmohan Nagori,
 Govardhan Das Nagori and Damodar Das Nagori were near
 relatives of Sampat Kumar Majeji and they sold the property in
 such a manner where it appeared that property changed hands but
 very cleverly it was within family members. Therefore, the
 petitioner and its predecessor in title since very beginning were not
 having any interest to run the business but to grab the land.
 Violation of condition No.14 of the lease deed and subsequent sale
 of the land in quick successions appear to have committed fraud by
 petitioner (and predecessors in title) on the State Government/
 Public resources. They committed fraud on the intention of
 erstwhile Gwalior State to establish industry.

34. Fraud vitiates all solemn proceedings. It is well settled principle of
 20

 law that Fraud Vitiates Everything. This principle has been dealt
 with by the Apex Court in its various judgments viz. in the case of R.
 Ravindra Reddy Vs. H. Ramaiah Reddy, (2010) 3 SCC 214,
 Badami Bai (D) Tr. L.R. Vs. Bhali, (2012) 11 SCC 574, Uddar
 Gagan Properties Ltd. Vs. Sant Singh, (2016) 11 SCC 378, K.D.
 Sharma Vs. SAIL, (2008) 12 SCC 481, Express Newspapers (P)
 Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133, DDA Vs. Skipper
 Construction, (2007) 15 SCC 601 and in the case of Jai Narain
 Parasrampuria Vs. Pushpa Devi Saraf, reported in (2006) 7 SCC

 756.

35. In R. Ravindra Reddy (supra), the Apex Court held as under:

 "39. As far as fraud is concerned, it is no doubt true, as
 submitted by Mr Ramachandran, that fraud vitiates all
 actions taken pursuant thereto and in Lord Denning's words
 "fraud unravels everything......."
36. Petitioner raised the ground that the land belongs to petitioner which
 is reflected from the revenue record but this aspect has been dealt
 with in detail and in right perspective by learned Writ Court in para
 13 to 16 in its order. If the name of M/s Gwalior Paints and Chemical
 Industries Ltd. was found in some of the Khasra entries even then it
 could have been because of allotment of land on lease for the time
 being. It is wroth mentioning the fact that petitioner nowhere
 established the fact regarding source of title over the land in question.
 Petitioner traces back its title to M/s Gwalior Paints and Chemical
 Industries Ltd. but how M/s Gwalior Paints and Chemicals Industries
 Ltd. came into possession of the said land, can only be deciphered by
 way of lease deed dated 11-02-1943 (Annexure P/8).

37. Permission to start factory was granted on the basis of application
 21

 filed by Sampat Kumar Majeji on 19-11-1942, therefore, if Sampat
 Kumar Majeji was the owner of the land in question then why he
 moved the application on 19-11-1942 to the Gwalior State for
 allotment of the land. If Sampat Kumar Majeji was owner of the suit
 property then why he asked for allotment of the land, is the question
 which was never answered by the petitioner in proceedings
 throughout.

38. Therefore, the only logic which can be drawn is that petitioner
 (predecessor in title) received allotment of the land for establishment
 of the industry with some stringent conditions not to lease out or
 transfer it to somebody else and understandably so. Purpose of the
 then State was to flourish the industries rather than to enrich unduly
 any individual by involving mischievously into the subsequent
 transactions which petitioner and its predecessors in title did. On this
 point also contention of petitioner fails and deserves rejection.

39. Another ground raised by the petitioner is regarding competence of
 the competent authority. Order is being passed by the Joint Collector
 Shri Suresh Kumar Sharma. In exercise of the power conferred under
 Section 17 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam, State Government vide its
 notification dated 05-02-1976 delegated its power to all Collectors of
 the State and thereafter the Collector, District Gwalior in exercise of
 the said power, vide order dated 27-12-2004 authorized Shri Suresh
 Kumar Sharma the then Joint Collector to act as competent authority
 under the Bedakhali Adhiniyam in the area within the municipal
 limit of Gwalior. Said notification and order are part of the record
 as Annexures along with additional reply filed by respondent No.3
 on 28-03-2019 vide document No.2381/2019.

40. Since Section 3 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam provides that State
 22

 Government may appoint an officer not below the rank of Assistant
 Collector or Deputy Collector and the fact remains that Joint
 Collector is over and above the Assistant Collector/Deputy
 Collector, therefore, no jurisdictional error caused if the Joint
 Collector passed the order dated 22-06-2005 as competent
 authority. So far as reliance laid by the petitioner over the judgment
 passed by the Single Bench in the case of Indu Gupta (supra) is
 concerned it does not lay down the correct law because Sections 3
 and 17 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam move in slightly different
 territorial realm. Section 3 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam is
 regarding appointment of Assistant Collector or Deputy Collector
 as competent authority for the purpose of this Act whereas Section
 17 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam gives authority to the State
 Government to delegate any power exerciseable under this Act to
 any other officer of the State Government also subject to some
 conditions as specified in the notification.

41. Therefore, Section 3 and Section 17 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam
 are not at loggerheads, rather Section 17 of the Bedakhali
 Adhiniyam complements Section 3 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam. At
 times, State Government requires some other officers also (for
 certain departments for some purposes), to act as competent
 authority for holding the proceedings for eviction under the
 Bedakhali Adhiniyam, then those officers can also be notified as
 competent authority.

42. Under Section 17 of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam those officers may
 be appointed as competent authority or may be appointed for
 specific purpose with specific powers for the purpose of the
 23

 Bedakhali Adhiniyam. Therefore, the judgment of Indu Gutpa
 (supra) passed by learned Single Judge, does not bind this Court
 and the arguments advanced by learned senior counsel for the
 petitioner lacks merits.

43. In other words, the then Joint Collector was competent authority to
 pass such order and the said authority after affording adequate
 opportunity of hearing to the parties, passed the impugned order.

44. The ground as raised by the petitioner in relation to
 competence/jurisdiction of competent authority, was never raised
 by the petitioner in proceedings before the competent authority or
 before appellate authority as well as before learned Writ Court.
 However, petitioner raised this point in specific term for the first
 time in Writ Appellate Court. Therefore, the said ground deserved
 to be rejected at the threshold, however, in the interest of justice,
 this point is discussed and thereafter rejected.

45. In fact proceedings were pending since 1978 and the impugned
 order was passed in 2005 after 27 years being consumed in such
 proceedings. The State Government/Collector/Joint Collector
 exercised all powers within the bounds of law and that too after
 affording more than adequate opportunity of hearing.

46. When the competent authority, appellate authority and learned Writ
 Court passed the exhaustive orders touching all the aspects of the
 case while framing issues/questions for consideration then the
 scope of writ appeal constricts. Even otherwise petition was filed
 under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and sought
 invocation of writ of Certiorari for quashment of the impugned
 orders passed by the quasi-judicial authority. Therefore, effectively
 24

 it was the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and
 decided by learned Writ Court as well as this Court. Scope of
 petition under Article 227 is well defined {See: Shalini Shyam
 Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC
 329}. Perusal of order dated 02-12-2016 passed by learned Writ
 Court reveals that all points have been discussed by learned Writ
 Court and thereafter passed the impugned order.

 47. Intervention application stands disposed of in light of the instant
 judgment.

 48. In the cumulative analysis, no case for interference is made out.
 Appeal sans merits and is hereby dismissed. Respondents to
 proceed accordingly.

 (ANAND PATHAK) (ROOPESH CHANDRA VARSHNEY)
Anil* JUDGE JUDGE

 ANIL KUMAR
 CHAURASIYA
 2024.12.20
 13:35:52 +05'30'